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I.

Executive Summary

Large multi-sided technology platforms have redefined how people
interact around the world. As network effects concentrate usage onto a
relatively small number of platforms (e.g., Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and
Alphabet's Google), those firms are increasingly targets of politicians,
regulators, and enforcement authorities who express concern about the
economic importance of one or more platforms, and whether each has or
could achieve dominance. While many antitrust experts argue that
traditional antitrust tools are ample to address any legitimate concerns about
these firms, others (sometimes referred to as antitrust "hipsters") question
whether more is required to adequately protect consumers, advertisers, or
journalists.
The issue is complicated because the application of competition laws to
technology platforms in key jurisdictions has been diverging. This article
provides an overview of the current dialogue globally, including the status of
enforcement and market studies in Europe, the United States, Australia,
China, and other key economies.
II.

Key issues

Antitrust enforcement authorities in leading jurisdictions have been
evaluating this new frontier of competition law either in enforcement actions
targeting specific platforms or in more general market studies. In particular,
several key questions have emerged:
* How should dominance be defined in the context of large multi-sided
technology platforms, and under what circumstances should any firms
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that may have achieved dominance by superior performance be
constrained going forward?
" When is a technology platform's preferential treatment of its own
service offerings sufficient to sustain a monopolization or abuse of
dominance action?
" Do traditional competitive effects tests focused on consumer welfare
rely too heavily on price effects, when large technology platforms
generally offer services free of charge to one user group (e.g.,
consumers) while being paid by another group (e.g., advertisers)?
" How should a technology platform's collection, use, and storage of
user data be assessed relative to other measures of market power?
How should the potential to exploit this data to the possible detriment
of consumer privacy be evaluated? Should such concerns be the
subject of antitrust analysis or privacy regulation?
" Does traditional merger analysis underestimate the potential
competitive significance of startups and technology innovators when
acquired by more established competitors?
The debate on the appropriate answers to these questions is continuing.
Some worry that under-enforcement and under-regulation will result in
further consolidation and entrenchment of market power among incumbent
platforms leading to significant long-term harm to consumers. Others
emphasize that the risks of over-deterrence are higher in dynamic industries,
where long-term competitive effects are inherently uncertain and short-term
intervention may ultimately deter investment in innovative new offerings.
III. Overview of Policy and Enforcement Initiatives by
Jurisdiction
Enforcement and legislative responses to these trends have varied.
European competition law enforcers - both at the European Commission
and in some Member States - have been more aggressive based on concerns
about potential under-enforcement against conduct by potentially dominant
firms and perceived abusive practices by some platforms. By contrast, US
antitrust enforcers have tended to perceive the most significant risk to be
over-enforcement, potentially resulting in a stifling of innovation and loss of
efficiencies, although that stance is currently being debated. Australia,
China, and other countries are carving out their own approaches tailored to
their own market structures but with broader implications.
A.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Over the past few years, the most active competition enforcement
involving digital platforms has been in Europe, both at the European
Commission and several EU Member States. At the Community level, the
European Commission has proceeded against Google for exclusionary and
discriminatory practices favoring its own platforms over competitors in a
number of enforcement actions.
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In June 2017, the Commission imposed a fine of EUR 2.4 billion on
Google relating to algorithms on its search platform giving
preferential treatment to its own Google Shopping Service relative to
competing shopping services.'
* A year later, the Commission imposed a record fine of EUR 4.34
billion related to restrictions on Android devices promoting the use of
Google's allegedly dominant search platform.2
* And in March 2019, the Commission fined Google EUR 1.49 for what
were deemed anticompetitive clauses in its AdSense contracts with
third-party websites restricting rivals from placing their search
3
advertisements on these websites.
The Commission has separately been conducting an extended market
inquiry into the e-commerce sector since 2015, including issues that may
arise where a vertically integrated platform competes with retailers offering
products or services on its site. 4 As a culmination of this inquiry, the
European Commission announced in September 2018 that it was
investigating Amazon and its role as a "hybrid" retail platform. 5 The
investigation focuses on whether Amazon is improperly gathering data from
third-party retailers on Amazon Marketplace and using it to develop sales of
its own products. As part of its Digital Single Market initiative, the EU has
also adopted a new Regulation aimed at creating what it deems to be a fair,
transparent and predictable environment for businesses and traders using
online platforms.6
*

B.

EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES

In European Member States, national competition authorities are taking
an active enforcement posture. The German and French authorities have
been particularly active, conducting wide-ranging investigations targeting
alleged discriminatory or exclusionary abuses of dominance. Enforcement
1. Press Release, European Commission, Commission fines Google 2.42 billion for abusing
dominance as search engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service
(June 27, 2017), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-17-1784_en.htm.
2. Press Release, European Commission, Commission fines Google 4.34 billion for illegal
practices regarding Android mobile devices to strengthen dominance of Google's search engine
(July 18, 2018), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP- 18-4581 en.htm.
3. Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines Google 1.49 billion
for abusive practices in online advertising (Mar. 20, 2019), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-releaseIP- 19-1770_en.htm.
4. European Commission, Finalreport on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, SVD (2017) 154 final
(May 10, 2017), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector inquiry-final-re
port-en.pdf.
5. See Rochelle Toplensky & Shannon Bond, EU opens probe into Amazon use of data about
merchants, FIN. TIMES, (Sept. 19, 2018), available at https://www.ft.com/content/a8c78888bc0f-1 le8-8274-55b72926558f.
6. Press Release, European Commission, Digital Single Market: EU negotiators agree to set
up new European rules to improve fairness of online platforms' trading practices (Feb.14, 2019),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-19-1168 en.htm.
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has also targeted so-called exploitative conduct involving "big data" based on
concerns that blur the line between antitrust, consumer protection, and
privacy.
1.

Germany

In Germany, the Federal Cartel Office ("FCO") has conducted a highprofile three-year enforcement action against Facebook that resulted in a
February 2019 FCO decision concluding that Facebook had abused its
"dominant position" in Germany by making use of its social network
conditional on the collection of user data from multiple sources. The FCO
termed this an "exploitative" abuse. Vhile Facebook was not fined, it was
ordered to change the way it collects data. If not overturned on appeal,
Facebook will no longer be allowed to combine data gathered from other
sources (social networking services such as its WhatsApp and Instagram
platforms as well as third-party sources) without voluntary user consent.7
Some have criticized the FCO's attribution of market power to Facebook
based on its access to user data, and questioned the use of competition laws
to address this conduct (rather than privacy regulation).
The FCO has recently launched an investigation into Amazon largely
focused on data usage, but it is also examining Amazon's terms of business
and practices towards third-party retailers.
2.

France

The French Competition Authority ("FCA") is proactively seeking a
competition policy suited to the digital age. In 2018, for the first time, the
FCA examined the merger of two online platforms resulting from the
acquisition of the French company Logic-Immo by the German group Axel
Springer. Both undertakings managed online advertising portals that allow
real estate agencies to display ads to potential buyers in France, and were
thereby operating on a two-sided market. The FCA took this opportunity to
define an analytical framework which takes into account market-specific
issues, such as the competitive risks associated with cross-network effects and
the exclusive collection of personal data. 8
The FCA has also indicated that the online advertising sector will
continue to undergo an in-depth examination as part of investigations
opened at the end of 2018, but the FCA has not disclosed the details of the
7. Facebook, exploitative business terms pursuant to Section 19(1) GJVB for inadequate data

processing, BUNDESKNRTELLAMT [FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE] (Feb. 6, 2019), availableat https://
www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Fallberichte/Missbrauchsaufsicht/
2019/B6-22-16.pdf.
8. See Isabelle de Silva, President, FCA, Assessing online platform mergers: Taking up the new
challenges faced by the French Competition Authority in the digital economy, CONCURRENCES
COMPETITION L. REV., No. 02-2018, at 39-49, available at http://www.autoritedelaconcur
rence.fr/doc/05.concurrences_2-2018_article i.de silva.pdf.
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investigations or the firms being looked at.9 The sector has already been the
subject of an inquiry in which the FCA identified potential anticompetitive
practices, such as restrictions on the accessing certain data, strategies
involving bundling or tied sales, discriminatory practices and impediments
to interoperability.10
The German and French authorities have launched a joint study on
algorithms and their implications on competition, to be completed later this
year." The FCO and FCA will examine to what extent algorithms might
facilitate collusion, assist in implementation of cartels or create additional
market-entry barriers.
3.

United Kingdom

The UK Parliament in a recent report has highlighted Facebook's
practices in competition and data privacy, and called on the UK competition
authority to investigate whether Facebook has been involved in
anticompetitive practices and to review its business practices towards other
developers "to decide whether Facebook is unfairly using its dominant
market position in social media to decide which businesses should succeed or
fail."12 A UK parliamentary committee in another recent report has
considered how competition regulation should respond to challenges of
digital markets. In merger control, the committee recommended that the
government consider introducing a "public interest test" for data-driven
mergers allowing the competition authority to intervene if a merger would
result in the creation of a data monopoly.3 An independent panel tasked
with examining competition in digital markets has also recently released a
9. See Press Release, FCA, The Autorite de la Concurrence announces its priorities for 2019
Jan. 11, 2019), available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.phpid-rub=
697&id article=3329&lang=en.
10. See Press Release, FCA, Sector-specific investigation into online advertising (Mar. 6,
2018), availableat http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?lang=EN&id-rub=
684&id article=3133 (announcing results of a preliminary investigation in sector inquiry on
"display" advertising). See also Press Release, FCA, Sector inquiry / Online advertising (Dec. 14,
2010), availableat http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?lang=EN&id-rub=
368&id article=514 (announcing results of sector inquiry on "search" advertising); Press
Release, FCA, The French Autorite de la concurrence and the German Bundeskartellamt
publish joint paper on data and its implications for Competition Law (10 May 2016), available at
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/multisite/ecn-brief/en/content/french-autorite-de -la-concurrence
-and-german-bundeskartellamt-publish-joint-paper-data-and.
11. Press Release, FCO, The French Autorite de la concurrence and the German
Bundeskartellamt launch a joint project on algorithms and their implications on competition
June 19, 2018), available at https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Press
emitteilungen/2018/19 06 2018_Algorithmen.html.
12. House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sports Committee, Disinformation and
fake news': Final Report (Feb. 14, 2019), available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf.
13. House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, Regulating in a digital world,
(Mar. 9, 2019), available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldcomuni/
299/299.pdf.
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report commissioned by the UK government setting out
14
recommendations for effective regulation of the digital economy.
4.

its

Other Member States

Other national authorities have opened investigations and considered
market studies on these issues. In February 2019, the Austrian authority
announced an investigation of whether Amazon is discriminating against
retailers by favoring its own products on its platform.5 And the Dutch
Government has recently published a discussion paper on online platforms
and the need for additional regulation.16
C.

UNITED STATES

The US agencies - the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
("DOJ") and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") - have largely
refrained from public enforcement actions against large multi-sided
technology platforms, but things may be changing. The White House and
members of Congress from both parties have called for closer scrutiny of the
platforms (focusing on varying concerns). The DOJ leadership has been
actively engaged in dialogue on their policy approach to technology
platforms. While leaving open the potential for enforcement, Makan
Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General (AAG) in charge of DOJ's Antitrust
Division, has suggested that traditional antitrust tools should continue to be
applied and caution should be exercised to avoid over-enforcement that
would threaten to deter innovation, taking "action only with credible
7
evidence of harm to competition and not harm to just competitors."'1
The future direction of the US enforcement authorities will bear
watching. In his confirmation hearing before the US Senate, recentlyconfirmed Attorney General William Barr recognized that being big was not
necessarily bad, but said that "a lot of people wonder how such huge
behemoths that now exist in Silicon Valley have taken shape under the nose
of the antitrust enforcers", adding that "You can win that place in the
marketplace without violating the antitrust laws, but I want to find out more
14. Unlocking digital competition: Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel (Mar. 2019),
available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment data/file/785547/unlocking-digital-competition furman review web.pdf.
15. FCA, Austrian FederalCompetition Authority initiates investigationproceedings againstAmazon
(Feb. 14, 2019), available at https://www.bwb.gv.atlen/news/detail/news/austrian-federal-com
petition-authority initiates-investigation proceedings against amazon/.
16. Discussion of competition policy on online platforms, OVERHELD.NL (Dec. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/mededinging-platforms.
17. Makan Delrahim, AAG, DOJ, Prepared Remarks on "Start Me Up": Start-Up Nations,
Innovation, and Antitrust Polity 8, (Oct. 17, 2018), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/file/1101506/.
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about that dynamic."IS Similarly, AAG Delrahim has stated in addressing
the issue of whether large firms should be required to share data with smaller
rivals: "we do not generally require firms, even dominant ones, to deal with
competitors. I am not yet convinced that we should have different rules for
data."19
The FTC has been considering the direction of enforcement in the
technology sector for several months. Since Fall 2018, the agency has been
conducting an ambitious set of public hearings on issues relevant to
technology platforms as part of its broader review of the digital economy.
Completed hearings to date have included multi-day sessions on topics
relevant to technology platforms, including: (i) identification and analysis of
collusive, exclusionary and predatory conduct by digital and technologybased platforms and evaluating acquisitions of potential or nascent
competitors in digital marketplaces; (ii) privacy, big data and competition;
(iii) algorithms, artificial intelligence and predictive analysis; (iv) data
security, and (v) competition and consumer protection issues in US
broadband markets.20
The FTC also announced a new Technology Task Force in February
Working closely with the Bureau of Economics and the Bureau of
Consumer Protection, the Task Force will include 17 staff attorneys from
across the Bureau of Competition with relevant expertise in markets for
online advertising, social networking, mobile operating systems and apps,
and platform businesses. The Task Force will reportedly be dedicated to
monitoring competition in US technology markets, investigating potential
anticompetitive conduct, and taking enforcement actions when warranted
22
including against previously consummated mergers.
2019.21

The US Congress has held hearings on technology sector enforcement.
In December 2018, there were House of Representatives hearings on digital
18. See Lauren Feiner, Attorney General Pick Barr Hints He Would Look at Antitrust in Tech,
CNBC (Jan. 15, 2019, 2:53PM), available at https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/15/attorneygeneral -nominee -william-barr-addresses -antitrust-and-tech.html.
19. Delrahim, supra note 17, at 13.
20. Further sessions (which were delayed by the federal government shutdown) include, inter
alia, sessions on: (i) the FTC's role in a changing world, and (ii) merger retrospectives. See
generally Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, FTC: POLICY,
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/hearings-competition-consumer-protection (last visited Mar. 11,
2019).
21. See Press Release, FTC, FTC's Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force to Monitor
Technology Markets (Feb. 26, 2019), available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re
leases/2019/02/ftcs-bureau-competition-launches-task-force-monitor-technology?utm source
=govdelivery [hereinafter FTC's Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force].
22. The FTC on-going hearings will consider merger retrospectives in a session scheduled for
April 12, 2019. Press Release, FTC, FTC Announces Agenda for the 13th Session of its
Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century (Mar. 4, 2019),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/03/ftc-announces-agenda14th-session-its-hearings-competition.
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platforms, including on Google's collection, use, and filtering of data23 The
Antitrust Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee recently held
hearings on the subject.24 And at least one Democratic Presidential
candidate, Elizabeth Warren, has proposed breaking up large platforms,
making part of their operations public utilities.25
D.

AUSTRALIA

Australia's approach to large multi-sided technology platforms is quickly
evolving. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
("ACCC") has undertaken a broad market study of digital platforms at the
direction of the government, focusing on the impact of platforms on media
and journalism as well as competition in advertising services markets.
In late 2018, the ACCC issued an interim report considering several novel
amendments to Australian competition and regulatory laws.26 The detailed
preliminary report included a finding that Google and Facebook both have a
substantial degree of market power in several relevant markets. While the
ACCC did not make any finding of anti-competitive conduct, it found the
platforms had the potential ability to favor their own interests in data,
advertising and the supply of content. Recommendations under
consideration include:
* introducing amendments to Australian merger law that would: (i)
require certain "digital platforms" to provide the ACCC with advance
notice of the acquisition of any business with activities in Australia;
and (ii) make clear that when assessing the likely competitive effects of
a merger, relevant factors include removal of a potential competitor
and access to data (including both amount and nature of the data);
* mandating that mobile device operating systems not provide a default
internet browser and suppliers of internet browsers not have a default
search engine; and
* establishing regulatory oversight of platforms' activities, including
algorithms, in the ranking of advertising and news and journalistic
content, and the potential consequences of those activities for news
media businesses and advertisers.
The ACCC report also recommends privacy law reform to address
potential consumer harm stemming from these digital platforms' collection
23. Hearing on Transpareny & Accountability: Examining Google and its Data Collection, Use and
FilteringPractices, H.R. Judiciary Comm. (December 11, 2018), available at https://republicansjudiciary.house.gov/hearing/transparency-accountability-examining-google -and-its -data-collec
tion-use-and-filtering-practices/.
24. Ben Remaly, Don't move away from consumer welfare, subcommittee head warns, GLOBAL
COMPETITION REVIEW (March 6, 2019), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/usa/ 1181
178/don%E2%80%99t-move-away-from-consumer-welfare-subcommittee-head-warns.
25. Elizabeth Warren, Here's how we can break up Big Tech, MEDILM (Mar. 8, 2019), https://
medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c.
26. Digital Platforms Inquiry Preliminary Report, ACCC (Dec. 10, 2018), available at https://
www.accc.gov.au/focus -areas/inquiries/digital-platforms -inquiry/preliminary-report.
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of user data and information. The recommendations include requiring (i)
express notification where data is collected by the platform or a third party,
(ii) express, opt-in, adequately informed and voluntarily given consent to
data collection, and (iii) that platforms erase personal information if
consumers withdraw their consent. The ACCC has further recommended
the development of an enforceable code of conduct for digital platforms to
increase transparency and control for consumers.
A large number of submissions have been made in response to the
preliminary report. The final report is due to be issued in June. In the
interim, the ACCC has confirmed that it is currently investigating five
possible contraventions of Australia's competition and consumer laws by as
yet unidentified digital platforms.
E.

AsIA PACIFIC

Competition authorities in Asia are focusing on large multi-sided
technology platforms, but the market structure in these jurisdictions vary.
Like Australia, the Japan Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC"), along with
two other Japanese ministries,27 published a policy paper defining several
fundamental principles for rulemaking concerning digital platform
businesses. The paper focused on promoting transparency and fairness in
competition with policy related to merger review and conduct
investigations.28 These principles require the effects on data and innovation
to be taken into consideration in merger review and investigations relating
to digital markets. The Japanese government is reportedly planning to
create a new expert body to support policy making and implement rules
related to competition and the data privacy practices of technology
companies including Facebook, Google, Amazon, and more geographically
limited firms like Tencent and Alibaba.29
Considering the distinct competitive dynamics of its national technology
markets, China's newly-consolidated competition authority the State
Administration for Market Regulation ("SAMR") - following the trajectory
of its three predecessors - is taking a more cautious approach to
enforcement related to large "digital" platforms than in other technology
segments such as hardware markets. A recent draft regulation on abuse of
dominance notes additional factors that need to be considered in
determining whether internet-based businesses have market dominant
positions including relevant competition characteristics, business models,
network effects, technological characteristics, market innovations, possession
27. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry ("METI") and Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications ("MIC").
28. FundamentalPrinciplesfor Rule Making to Address the Rise of Platform Businesses, METI (Dec.
18, 2018), available at https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2018/1218 002.html.
29. Interim Report of the Study Group for the Improvement of the Trade Environment Involving
Digital Platform Businesses, METI (December 12, 2018), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/
english/press/2018/1212_004.html.
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of relevant data and the power of operators on associated markets.30 SAMR
has devoted increasing scrutiny to these markets with proposed regulation of
digital platforms reportedly under development and has begun to pursue
enforcement activities related to digital platforms with a particular focus on
data. For example, last December, SAMR reportedly opened a separate
abuse of dominance investigation against ride sharing platform DiDi,
unrelated to its acquisition of Uber China which was also under
investigation.31 More recently, two local antitrust authorities in China
started probing Meituan's food delivery service platform for potential abuse
of dominance violations.32 There are also recent private enforcement actions
alleging digital platforms' abuse of dominance.33
Other Asian countries may launch regulatory or enforcement initiatives
focused on technology platforms. In India, for example, the government has
reportedly introduced more direct regulatory measures to prevent
discriminatory practices by e-commerce vendors, preventing platforms such
as Amazon from giving its own products or those of its affiliates preferential
treatment by banning such sales altogether.34 The regulation followed a
ruling by India's Competition Commission that Amazon and Walmart
subsidiary Flipkart did not abuse any dominant positions to favor select
sellers, in response to complaints from trade groups. 35 Further
developments in each of the Asia-Pacific countries will need to be watched.
IV. Outlook for the "New Frontier" of Enforcement Involving
Digital Platforms
As the foregoing review confirms, the spotlight is firmly set on technology
platforms as an actual or potential enforcement focus in a number of
jurisdictions. While many in-house and outside antitrust practitioners agree
that existing competition law tools are sufficient to handle potential antitrust
concerns involving platforms, going forward, there are several key themes
30. See Draft Regulation on Banning the Abuse of Dominant Market Position, SAMR (Jan. 30,
2019), available at http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/bgt/201902/W020190216628441906168.pdf.
31. China's SAMR launchesprobe of Didi for alleged abuse of e-hailing dominance, PARR (Dec. 7,
2018), available at https://app.parr-global.com/intelligence/view/prime-2752079.
32. Chinese local authoritiesprobe Meituan for 'choosing one from two' underAML, PARR (Feb. 15,
2019), available at https://app.parr-global.com/intelligence/view/prime-2786317.
33. For example, JD.com recently filed an antitrust suit against Alibaba in a Beijing court,
alleging that Alibaba's Tmall.com required merchants "choosing one from two [ecommerce
sites]" harms competition and amounts to abuse of dominance. See ]D.com files antitrust suit
against Alibaba in Be~iing court, PARR (Jan. 10, 2018), available at https://app.parr-global.com/
intelligence/view/prime-2566007.
34. Aftab Ahmed & Sankalp Phartiyal, India tightens e-commerce rules, likely to hit Amazon,
Flipkart, REUTERS (Dec. 26, 2018, 12:1 1PM), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/usindia-ecommerce/india-tightens-e -commerce -rules-likely-to- hit-amazon-flipkart-idUSKCN
1OP14M.
35. Mugdha Variyar, Flipkart,Amazon not dominant hence not in contravention of Competition Act,
ECON. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018, 12:25PM), available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
articleshow/66534244.
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that can be expected from enforcement and regulation of platform markets.
Given that large technology platforms operate around the world,
developments in some jurisdictions may have significant impact on the
operations of technology platforms in other places.
A.

FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE BURDEN TO SHOW

EXCLUSIONARY EFFECTS

The leading antitrust enforcement concern is that technology platforms
will use their substantial size and position to exclude or discriminate against
potential competitors (e.g. Google Shopping/Search, Amazon Marketplace,
Apple App Store). As enforcers scrutinize potential conflicts of interest and
delve deeper into the mechanics of platform algorithms, they will need to
carefully weigh the enforcement risks of not challenging potential
exclusionary or discriminatory conduct against those of proceeding against
conduct that turns out to be pro-competitive or competitively benign.
While political sentiment may or may not encourage a lower threshold for
challenging potential anticompetitive effects, this may be cabined by
established standards and judicial precedent. For example, under established
US precedent, firms (even monopolists) generally have no obligation to deal
with their competitors or provide them with equal treatment. In the US,
enforcers and private litigants bear a significant burden in court to show the
likelihood of a potential anticompetitive effect. US enforcers have in the
past chosen not to pursue enforcement actions against platforms where there
is a plausible pro-competitive benefit in service offerings and innovation,
including, for example, the FTC closing an investigation of Google search
bias in 2013.36
Europe has shown greater willingness to pursue enforcement actions
where there is a perceived risk of anticompetitive effects involving similar or
the same conduct. Unlike the US, the prevailing view in Europe is that
there is no need to demonstrate actual exclusionary effect, and all that is
required is that the firm in question be shown to be dominant, the conduct
be shown to be abusive and potential anticompetitive effects be shown to be
possible. Once such a showing is made, the pursued firm can base its
defense on proving in fact the absence of potential anticompetitive effects or
showing offsetting pro-competitive benefits. 3r In view of the substantive
differences between EU and US standards, European enforcers have
diverged from the FTC in their assessment of prior investigations involving
Google's search platform, imposing the significant fines described above.
One question is whether competition authorities in other parts of the world
36. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google's Search Practices,In re Google,
FTC File No. 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu
ments/public-statements/statement-commission-regarding-googles-search-practices/ 130103

brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf.
37. Case C-23/14, Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrenceradet, ECLI:EU:C:2015: 651 (CJ Oct.

6, 2015) [hereinafter "Post Danmark II"].
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will hue more closely to the European or US approach, as well as whether
the US will continue to adhere to its less activist approach. At the heart will
be a fundamental question of weighing the relative risks of false positives in
over- and under-enforcement, within the confines of precedent and other
legal constraints.
B.

GREATER Focus ON MULTI-SIDED MARKETS AND ZERO-PRICE
OFFERINGS

In their assessments, enforcers will need to give closer and more explicit
consideration to the special features of large multi-sided technology
platforms. While the concept of two-sided markets has been well developed
in academic writing, the practical impact on the assessment of competitive
effects is still evolving. In the wake of the Supreme Court decision in Ohio v.
American Express, US agencies and courts will need to more explicitly factor
analysis of two-sided markets into the evaluation of overall competitive
effects.38 Other jurisdictions are likely to more closely consider these
features as well.
As part of this evolution, non-price competition factors that are already
examined as part of existing enforcement may become more important. In
particular, enforcers are likely to look more closely at loss of innovation or
service quality for consumers of free services.39 But these features are
difficult to quantify and assess on a standalone basis. While enforcers are
likely to rely heavily on internal documents to establish competitive
dynamics, care should be taken to critically assess party documents to avoid
placing too much weight on what may be overly optimistic or unrealistic
predictions of market effect in an inherently uncertain competitive
environment.
C.

EXPERIMENTATION WITH NEW THEORIES OF HARM

A more controversial concern is exploitation of consumer data.40 As
privacy considerations become increasingly important in the assessment of
platform markets, lawmakers and enforcement authorities will need to
consider the best avenue for addressing potential concerns. Many
jurisdictions are likely to turn to privacy regulation as a solution for some of
the exploitation concerns associated with consumer data. A careful balance
will need to be struck between ensuring sufficient fairness and transparency
without reducing consumer choice.
38. Ohio v. American Express, 585 U.S. -, 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
39. Makan Delrahim, AAG, DOJ, Keynote Address at Silicon FlatironsAnnual Technology Polity
Conference: "I'm Free": Platforms and Antitrust Enforcement in the Zero-Price Economy (February
11, 2019), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makandelrahim-delivers-keynote-address -silicon-flatirons.
40. Id. (warning against the distortion of antitrust standards based on concerns about privacy,
inadequate notice, unauthorized use of data, and data protection).
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As noted above, actions have already been taken under the rubric of
privacy protection (rather than antitrust) in France and Germany, and other
authorities may consider taking such actions. For example, the FTC is
reportedly considering imposition of large fines on Facebook for privacy
violations involving sharing of consumer data with a third party (Cambridge
Analytics) without user consent, and the fines may exceed the $22 million
fine imposed on Google in 2012. And, as noted above, the UK parliament
issued a report in February 2019 following an inquiry into conduct by
Facebook recommending an investigation into alleged abuse of dominance
and privacy issues.
In Australia, ACCC Chairman Rod Sims is opposed to introducing
broader public interest considerations into the core of competition law
enforcement. 41 While such an approach would preserve antitrust doctrinal
purity, the ACCC - as both consumer law and competition law regulator has the option of taking action on either or both grounds. As noted above,
the ACCC has also made recommendations to revise consumer and privacy
law so as to address any issues that are not within the ambit of competition
law.42
D.

RENEWED Focus ON TREATMENT OF DATA

Enforcement authorities will likely seek to further refine their assessment
of the competitive implications of different types of data and the potential
effect on competition, particularly where that data might reasonably create
market power. While European national competition authorities may be
taking a broad view of the market power established by consumer data on
social media platforms, the US DOJ has urged caution in defining what data
could convey market power considering factors such as how quickly data
loses its competitive significance and the potential for other sources of
equivalent data. 43 In the ACCC's recent preliminary report, the way in
which purportedly dominant platforms collect and use consumer data was a
focus of both the findings and the recommendations. Globally, the
implications of data collection on competition look to be a continuing
feature of public dialogue concerning technology platforms.
Enforcers will likely give closer consideration to remedies requiring access
to data. In investigations focused on a platform's use of data on competing
sales, for example, questions have increasingly been raised on whether a
dominant firm could have an obligation to provide access to the data it
collects. While this behavioral access remedy has generally not been
required to date and most remedies have been focused on fines or
prohibitions, there are suggestions that the European Commission and
others may be considering these sorts of non-traditional remedies in cases
41. Rod Sims, Chairman, ACCC, Speech to RBB Economics Confrence (Nov. 29, 2018), available
at https://www.accc.gov.au/speech/address-to-the-2018-annual-rbb-economics-conference.
42. Digital Platforms Inquiry Preliminary Report, supra note 26.
43. See Delrahim, supra note 17, at 13
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involving technology platforms. Competition Commissioner Margrethe
Vestager has stated that it will be necessary to ensure that competition rules
are "ready for a world where data becomes even more vital"; she has
emphasized that any proposed rules will have to be fair to companies that
need the data to compete as well as those who have put money and effort
into building the datasets. 44 AAG Delrahim's above-quoted comments
about imposing obligations to share data with competitors are very much to
the contrary.
In contrast to Europe, China is taking a relatively cautious approach in
enforcement involving technology platforms and other internet-based
businesses. SAMR has not developed a separate strategy to tackle the bigdata issue, partly because Google and Facebook are still not allowed to
operate in China. But public concerns regarding the three large domestic
platforms - Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent - have prompted SAMR to study
internet-based businesses. SAMR appears to be cautious in defining relevant
markets, a critical component of SAMR's enforcement analysis.
E.

CLOSER SCRUTINY OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS INVOLVING
START-UPS AND INNOVATORS

Merger reviews involving technology platforms acquiring startups and
nascent competitors can be expected to receive increasing scrutiny. EU
Competition Commissioner Vestager has discussed concerns around "killer
acquisitions" where large technology companies purportedly block
innovation by acquiring smaller innovators to close them down. 45 Nobel
Economist Jean Tirole and European Commission chief economist Thomas
Valletti have each noted that a possible solution would be to shift the burden
of proof onto technology platforms, requiring them to prove efficiencies
before a proposed acquisition is allowed to proceed.46 In the US, the
enforcement approach will need to be calibrated with judicial precedent for
challenging acquisitions of potential competitors which sets a significant
burden of proof for the government. 47
44. Margrethe Vestager, Making the data revolution work for us, Mackenzie Stuart Lecture (Feb.
4, 2019), available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/
announcements/making-data-revolution-work-us en.
45. Margrethe Vestager, Shaping Competition Polity in the Era of Digitisation, Brussels (Jan. 17,
2019), available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager!
announcements/shaping-competition-policy-era-digitisation en.

46. Janith Aranze, DG Comp chief economist: Reverse burden of proof to catch killer acquisitions,
GCR (Nov. 20, 2018), available at https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1177095/dg-

comp-chief-economist-reverse-burden-of-proof-to-catch-killer-acquisitions;

Allison Schrager,

A Nobel-winning economists guide to taming tech monopolies, QUARTZ (June 27, 2018), https://
qz.com/1310266/nobel-winning-economist-jean-tirole-on-how-to-regulate-tech-monopolies/.

47. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 978 (N. D. Ohio
2015) (considering whether the potential competitor "probably would have entered the
[relevant antitrust] market .

.

. within a reasonable period of time" absent the merger and

rejecting the FTC's request for a preliminary injunction to block the merger at issue).
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Overall, the debate around nascent competitors raises questions on
antitrust tolerance for false-positives in enforcement actions against
acquisitions where the future impact is uncertain and potential efficiencies
may be lost as a result of what may ultimately be determined to have been an
overly-aggressive enforcement. On the other hand, American Antitrust
Institute President Diana Moss has argued that US enforcers have given too
much credence to efficiency claims in allowing mergers to proceed with
divestitures rather than stopping them outright. While the example Ms.
Moss cited was airline mergers, this claim can be and has been made by
European authority leaders against technology platforms, as noted above.
FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra, a Democrat, suggested in mid-February
2019 that there may be a need for far greater scrutiny of claimed efficiencies
in mergers. Commissioner Chopra pointed to Google's $1.65 billion
acquisition of YouTube more than a decade ago as an example of an "eyepopping" price for a buyout that turned into a crucial transaction, as well as
Facebook's $1 billion acquisition of Instagram when it had no sales
48
revenue.
Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, the ITC's other Democratic Commissioner, has
similarly questioned the efficiencies associated with mergers and suggested
potential post-merger retrospectives to better understand the competitive
effect of transactions that have been allowed to close. On April 12, 2019, the
FTC will hold a hearing in which the potential for a study of merger
retrospectives will be considered. While FTC Chairman Joseph Simons has
indicated an open mind on the subject, questions have been raised on the
potential costs and Simons has noted that the analysis needs to focus on what
would have happened absent the merger. 49 To further consider the subject,
the FTC's new Technology Task Force will reportedly not only support staff
in reviewing prospective mergers, but also in reviewing consummated
mergers in the technology sector.5 0 It is far from clear whether such an
approach would improve the FTC's ability to judge competitive effects of
mergers of potential competitors, while posing significant risks for potential
acquirers if this can be used to support future post-consummation
challenges.
In Australia, the ACCC has acknowledged the difficulty of predicting the
"likely future" when reviewing acquisitions involving nascent competitors
and startups, since it is often only with hindsight that it becomes clear that
particular technologies had the potential to thrive and compete vigorously,
while also noting that such transactions can lead to a large reduction in
48. . Rohit Chopra, Commissioner, FTC, PreparedRemarksfor the Silicon FlatironsConfrence 2
(Feb. 10, 2019), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public-statements/
145363 3/remarks of commissioner chopraatsilicon flatirons.pdf.
49. Nadia Dreid, Size Doesn't Matterfor Old Mergers,FTC ChairSays, LAw360 (Mar. 20, 2019,
6:50PM), https://www.law3 60.com/consumerprotection/articles/ 141153/size -doesn-t-matterfor-old-mergers-ftc-chair-says.
50. See FTC's Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force, supra note 21.
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competition. 51 The ACCC is also recommending that certain platforms
provide it with advance notice of the acquisition of any business with
activities in Australia and that the country's merger laws be amended to
make clear that the nature and volume of data is a relevant consideration in
merger assessment. It is worth noting that arguably the ACCC is already
able to take this into account (and has already done so in a merger not
involving a digital platform52).
Some EU Member States have been considering amending merger
control provisions to include size of transaction tests as an alternative to
turnover thresholds to capture potentially anticompetitive acquisitions
involving startups. Such laws were adopted in Germany and in Austria in
2017, 53 and these authorities have adopted joint guidelines to explain how
the new thresholds work. 54 There have also been discussions in France as to
whether size of transaction thresholds should be adopted or whether the
FCA could review transactions below the current thresholds, after closing, to
determine if they have led to anticompetitive effects. 55 The European
Commission has also considered whether its rules should be amended to
ensure that they catch data-related transactions that might affect
competition. At present, the only way this can be done is through what is

51. Digital Platforms Inquiry Preliminary Report, supra note 26, at 63 -64; Data economy drives
dynamic changes, ACCC (Oct. 15, 2018), available at https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/
data-economy-drives-dynamic-changes (containing excerpts of speech by ACCC Chair Rod
Sims).
52. In a proposed acquisition involving toll road operators in which one party enjoyed access
to "highly detailed traffic data" unavailable to other competitors, the ACCC allowed the deal to
proceed subject to the acquirer agreeing to an undertaking to regularly publish that traffic data
so it was available to rivals. See Sydney Transport Partners Consortium (including Transurban)
proposed acquisition of WestConnev interest, ACCC: PUBLIC INFORMAL MERGER REVIEW
REGISTER (Aug. 30, 2018), available at https://www.accc.gov.au/public-registers/mergersregisters/public-informal-merger-reviews/sydney-transport-partners-consortium-includingtransurban-proposed-acquisition-of-westconnex-interest.
53. In Germany, the 9th Amendment Package to the Act against Restraints of Competition
(Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrinmkungen, or GVB) which came into force on June 9, 2017;
In Austria, the Austrian Cartel and Competition Law Amendment Act 2017 (Kartellgesetz, or
KartG) which became effective on November 1, 2017.
54. BUNDESKARTELLAMT, GUIDANCE ON TRANSACTION VALUE THRESHOLDS FOR
MANDATORY PRE-MERGER NOTIFICATION (SECTION 35 (1A) GWVB AND SECTION 9 (4)
KARTG) (July 2018), available at https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/
EN/Leitfaden/LeitfadenTransaktionsschwelle.pdf?
blob=publicationFile&v=2; see also Press
Release, Bundeskartellamt, Joint guidance on new transaction value threshold in German and
Austrian merger control - Publication of final version (July 9, 2018), available at https://
www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2018/09 07 2018
_LeitfadenTransaktionsschwelle.pdf?
blob=publicationFile&v=3.
55. See Press Release, FCA, The Autorite de la concurrence announces several measures
aimed at streamlining and simplifying mergers' procedures for companies (June 7, 2018),
available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id-r-ub=684&id-article=
3182&lang=en.
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referred to as a "back door" approach whereby a Member State's
competition authority refers the matter to the Commission.56
F.

DEBATE ON CONSUMER WELFARE VS. TOTAL WELFARE TESTS

Finally, one source has suggested a different approach than considered
above. Christine Wilson, one of the FITC's Republican Commissioners, has
suggested increased attention be paid to a total welfare standard in
evaluating mergers and conduct restrictions rather than the consumer
welfare approach, noting that Canada has long pursued a total welfare
approach.5r From an economic perspective, a total welfare approach takes
into account consumer welfare plus producer welfare. While there may be
some confusing nomenclature, some activists and antitrust "hipsters" are also
advocating that non-competition factors be included in antitrust reviews.
Chairman Rod Sims has stated that the ACCC generally uses a consumer
welfare standard in competition assessment, although it may occasionally use
a total welfare standard to prevent more general economic harm (in
infrastructure decisions and a small number of merger and enforcement
decisions). At the same time, as noted, Mr. Sims is opposed to introducing
broader public interest considerations into the core of competition law
enforcement.58

V.

Conclusion

It remains to be seen where antitrust enforcement regarding large multisided technology platforms is heading. As this review shows, there are
common themes and concerns prominent in the global dialogue. The
business practices of platforms will undoubtedly remain in the spotlight for
many politicians and enforcers - not just the US-based tech companies such
as Amazon, Facebook, and Google, but also firms that are presently more
geographically limited in scope such as Tencent and Alibaba. There may be
56. For example, the Apple / Shazam deal received EU scrutiny only because the Austrian
competition authority referred the matter to the Commission. Apple/Shazam (Case M.8788)
Commission Decision C(2018) 5748 final (June 9, 2018).

57. Christine E. Wilson, Commissioner, FTC, Luncheon Keynote Address at George Mason Law
Review 22nd Annual Antitrust Symposium on Welfare Standards Underlying Antitrust Enforcement:
ffWhat You Measure is ffWhat You Get (Feb. 15, 2019), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/

documents/public-statements/1455663/welfare-standard-speech_-_cmr-wilson.pdf.

There

have been vocal debates in the US Congress, particularly among Senators on the Antitrust
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Several Senators have decried an increase in
overall concentration, while others, including the current Chairman, have counseled against

moving away from a consumer welfare standard. See Remaly, supra note 24.
58. Rod Sims, Commissioner, ACC, Address to the 2018 Annual RBB Economics Conference
(Nov. 29, 2018), available at https://www.accc.gov.au/speech/address-to-the-2018-annual-rbbeconomics -conference; ACCC 2019 focus on consumer guarantees and anti-competitive practices,
ACCC (Feb. 26, 2019), available at https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-2019-focus-on-

consumer-guarantees-and-anti-competitive-practices (containing excerpts of speech by ACCC
Chair Rod Sims).
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efforts to implement the results of the market studies currently being
conducted in the US, Europe, and Asia into legislation, regulation, and
potentially new enforcement actions across common theories of harm.
Mergers and acquisitions in the sector can be expected to garner increasing
public scrutiny, particularly those involving significant valuations for
startups and nascent competitors. And prevailing views on how to assess
data, innovation, and platforms will continue to be developed and debated by
scholars and enforcers alike.
There are many open questions on how the new frontier of competition
law will develop. Will European competition authorities continue to take an
activist approach (as appears likely), when there are serious concerns about
those actions potentially stifling innovation and depriving consumers of
services they value? Will the US authorities continue to pursue a cautious
approach or will the FTC and Congressional hearings lead to more activism
pushing the boundaries of judicial precedent? And where will the
competition authorities in other jurisdictions land? The answers to these
questions will likely have significant effects not only for the global businesses
of these platforms, but for the future development of the technology sector
more generally.
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